10/17/2022
Women hit the political glass ceiling at China’s Communist Party Congress
Susan Shirk:Xi Jinping Has Fallen Into the Dictator Trap
The Dictator Trap of Xi Jinping
President Xi Jinping’s first decade in power has been a study in hubris. He has purged political rivals and adopted heavy-handed policies that have imperiled China’s economy. He laid the groundwork for a crackdown in the Xinjiang region that drove Muslim citizens into thought reform camps and has alarmed and alienated neighbors with an aggressive foreign policy.
And things just might get worse.
The Chinese Communist Party congress, which opens on Sunday, is expected to hand Mr. Xi another five years as general secretary of the party. Rather than a reassuring sign of continuity, his third term as the top leader of China could spell years of uncertainty as problems mount around an unbound leader who has shown little inclination to share decision-making.
Mr. Xi fell into the same trap that has ensnared dictators throughout history: He overreached. He has concentrated more power in his hands than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, looming so completely over the country that he’s been called the “chairman of everything.”
Rivals — real and imagined — have been removed through an extensive anti-corruption campaign. Two more top former officials were jailed last month, accused of financial crimes and disloyalty to Mr. Xi. Mr. Xi has openly accused other politicians of plotting against the party from the outset of his purge ten years ago. He values fealty to himself as more important than competence, and subordinates compete to prove their loyalty by carrying out his policies to the extreme rather than raising harsh truths about negative consequences.
This is precisely the sort of situation that Deng Xiaoping and other former Communist Party leaders had set out to prevent with changes introduced decades ago.
The over-concentration of power in Mao’s hands led to decisions such as his misguided Great Leap Forward, a campaign to greatly increase agrarian and industrial output in the late 1950s that led instead to a devastating famine, and the chaotic political violence of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.
After Mao’s death in 1976, Mr. Deng made leadership competition more predictable by introducing term limits and retirement ages for leading posts in the government and military and giving party institutions more authority. A pattern of decade-long reigns set in. But Mr. Deng refused to give China’s legislature and courts authority over the party. Party institutions — their members all appointed by senior leaders — proved to be pushovers for Mr. Xi. No visible resistance was raised when he engineered the abolition of presidential term limits in 2018, which could allow Mr. Xi, who is 69, to stay in power until he dies or is deposed in a power struggle.
The costs of his overreach are piling up.
Mr. Xi, who favors a state-led, centrally controlled economy, began an abrupt crackdown on major Chinese internet companies last year, part of a plan to redistribute wealth and rein in the private sector. That has been put on the back burner for now, but not before it wiped billions of dollars from the valuations of innovative companies and cast a pall over entrepreneurship, exacerbating an extended Chinese economic slowdown.
And while the rest of the world has learned to live with the pandemic, Mr. Xi has stubbornly refused to loosen his zero-tolerance approach. Officials nationwide are overzealously imposing mass lockdowns and surveillance in a bandwagon dynamic that has echoes of the Great Leap Forward, when officials over-complied with Mao’s damaging directives.
The Covid policy has angered citizens and saddled local governments with the huge costs of constant testing and quarantining. Private companies stricken by the disruption and regulatory crackdowns are laying off employees, and college graduates are struggling to find jobs. For the first time in years, unemployment has become a serious political risk for the party, and a tanking Chinese real estate market threatens to pull down the entire economy.
On foreign policy, Mr. Xi abandoned decades of Chinese restraint in favor of a muscular approach designed to restore China’s historical status as a leading power but which is harming its standing in the world.
China has militarized disputed islets in the South China Sea, threatened military action against Taiwan, picked a border fight with India and cut off many imports from Australia after that country’s government called for an international investigation into the origins of the pandemic. Mr. Xi destroyed Hong Kong’s autonomy and has deepened China’s isolation from Europe and the United States by aligning with President Vladimir Putin of Russia just before Mr. Putin launched his brutal invasion of Ukraine.
Countries that could have been Beijing’s valued partners have joined ranks against China in coalitions like the Quad, which groups together the United States, Japan, Australia and India. The United States and some European countries, whose trade and investment inflows were crucial to China’s re-emergence as an economic power, are now apparently less willing to do business. As Germany’s economy minister, Robert Habeck, said of Chinese protectionism and pressure to ignore its human rights abuses, his country would no longer “allow ourselves to be blackmailed.”
The greatest risk now facing China and the world is that the consequences of Mr. Xi’s misrule could lead to a point where he feels compelled to provoke a foreign conflict to divert domestic public attention. Mr. Xi’s continued reluctance to share power also could increase the risk of an internecine split in his third term. The level of dissent within the secretive Communist Party is difficult to gauge, but possible signs of frustration have emerged.
It’s anyone’s guess how much longer Mr. Xi’s rule will last, but there appears no end in sight. The party normally selects a successor five years in advance to groom and introduce him to the Chinese public. But everyone is in the shadow cast by Mr. Xi, who has so far given no hint who his eventual successor might be.
Next week’s congress will be closely watched for clues that other leaders might be allowed to take on more power and responsibility. But that seems unlikely. Mr. Xi is almost certain to stay in character, packing the top leadership with his loyalists. And the more concentrated his power, the greater the hazards for China and the world.
The post Xi Jinping Has Fallen Into the Dictator Trap appeared first on New York Times.
10/02/2022
《月明世暗 ——- 错爱的民族主义》
《十月一日思問录》
梁家河毫无精神 |
1969年,一個16歲的懵懂少年和其他14個孩子,上山下鄉來到黃土高坡,一個只有四十戶農家,连小学都没有的偏僻山村——— 梁家河。
2012年,曾經荒廢七年青春歲月的少年,36年後,搖身一變成了主宰14億人的大國党魁。一時間,梁家河精神,梁家河文化,梁家河特產,梁家河紅色之旅,風靡全國各地⋯⋯
什麼是「梁家河精神」?人們不禁要問,全國民眾研究梁家河精神,學習梁家河文化,購買梁家河特產,把梁家河的小米吃進肚裡,梁家河的水喝進嘴裡,梁家河的黃土吸進肺里,中國將會有什麼樣的結果?
遙想文革期間,韶山,井岡山,延安…… 凡是某偽人生活過的地方都變成了革命聖地。因為全國上下盲目崇拜,造成神州內外愚昧貧窮。如今,歷史又在重演,劇情幾乎雷同,膜拜的民眾和崇拜的主角也讀驚人的相似。
近幾年間,無數的盲流像蒼蠅聞臭似的奔赴梁家河。那些愚人要學習什麼?打算把自己的孩子送到梁家河體驗憶苦思甜的生活嗎?還是準備自己在黃土窯洞里度過七年飢寒交迫的歲月?
窮山惡水之地的梁家河,能給中國提供什麼精神?孕育出什麼文化?
荷蘭人進行環球航海的時候,明朝人毀了鄭和的海洋艦隊。
英國人進入工業革命的時候,滿洲人忙宮廷內鬥閉關鎖國。
西班牙人將西語推向全球化,漢族人將漢語应用錯別字化。
日本人正在飛速發展經濟時,共產黨人卻在大搞階級鬥爭。
西方人具有落地生根的精神,東方人固守落葉歸根的理念。
美國人正在研究两纳米芯片,中國人卻在學習梁家河精神。
國人应该睜开双眼看世界,別再一副文革時期的傻逼樣,整天沈溺於內鬥,高舉這個旗幟,學習那個精神,堅持某個主義,在自作孽的泥潭里窮折騰,在人肉的醬缸里瞎胡鬧。
美國沒有偉大領袖,強大到沒有對手。日本沒有先進思想,先進得世界羨慕。瑞典沒有革命聖地,富裕成人間天堂。
落後不會挨打,
如科威特,芬兰、瑞典。
虽然伊拉克彪悍,
但愚昧驕橫一定會挨打;
弱國自有外交,
如乌克兰,中华民国。
尽管俄羅斯強大,
違反公義必孤立失败。
核武無法取勝,
如普京對烏的核威脅。
儘管俄擁有核武器,
喪失良知自作孽必滅亡。